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Why Implicit Control cannot be a syntactic or semantic relation between arguments
Alexander Williams and Jeffrey J. Green, University of Maryland
Implicit control (IC) is the apparent anaphora on display when we use (1) to mean (2). In this talk we develop
two objections to grammatical accounts of IC with rationale clauses, which analyze it as identification of
two variables in the meaning of the sentence. Such accounts, whether syntactic ([1]) or semantic [2,3]), can
explain neither remote IC, as in (3), nor the truth-conditions of the rationale construction. Our objections
thus favor the view of IC as a restrictive variety of discourse anaphora, as urged in [4,5]. In turn they weaken
the persistent claim that IC indicates the syntactic presence of an ‘implicit argument’ in short passives.
(1)
(2)

Two outfielders were traded away (in order) to acquire a better pitcher.
Someonek traded away two outfielders so that theyk might acquire a better pitcher.

We use “implicit control” for any case where PRO is meant to have a particular referent, but that referent
has not yet been audibly mentioned. Used to mean (2), (1) is a classic kind of example, where an infinitival
rationale clause follows a short passive target clause ([6,7,8]). The intended referent of PRO is the trader
entailed by the target clause, but this trader is named by no audible dependent. On grammatical accounts,
this shows that (1)’s meaning has two instances of the same variable, filling the roles of trader and acquirer.
Syntactic versions ([1,9]) derive this by a kind of binding across syntactically dependent clauses: PRO is
linked in syntax either to a silent DP in the target clause, or to a position in its argument structure, with the
result that they must be covalued. Semantic versions ([2,3] derive it instead via the meaning of relation that
takes as arguments the phrase with PRO, and the one with its implicit antecedent. Here this would be the
REASON relation, sometimes pronounced “in order,” between the rationale and target clauses. Despite their
strong motives ([1,11,12]), these are the analyses we argue against, supporting [4,5] and others.
Our first objection concerns remote IC ([2,13,15]), where the rationale clause is syntactically independent of its target clause, as in (3).
(3)

a. Two outfielders were traded.

b.

The reason/goal/. . . was to acquire a better pitcher.

Remote and local control should receive the same account, since constraints on interpreting PRO apply
equally in both ([2,13,16]). But in remote control there can be no binding from the target to the rationale clause, we assume, since the two are syntactically independent. Nor are the two clauses surface coarguments to any predicate whose meaning might abstract over a variable in both. So if syntactic accounts
are to handle (3), the copular sentence must contain a silent element that will bind PRO locally in non-surface
syntax. And on semantic accounts, the noun in the subject (reason, goal, etc.) must have as arguments both
the complement of the copula and some silent reprise of the target clause predicate. Our objection is that
these ideas cannot be executed plausibly; for brevity we focus here on the first.
We envision two variants of the idea and reject both. First, a subject like the goal might be a quieter
version of his goal or their goal (etc.), so that (3b) has a structure like (4). Already this is weak, as it
replaces the question of why there can be an implicit antecedent for PRO just in rationale clauses, with the
equally hard question of why there can be one just for a silent possessor in the goal, even when an audible
pronoun there is not equally felicitous. But worse, (5) goes against (4) directly. Reflexives in picture-NPs
can sometimes have a non-c-commanding antecedent. But typically the antecedent must then name the
logophoric center ([17]). Since this is unlikely for (5), the syntax per se is more clear: a possessor in the
subject of a copular sentence cannot bind into the complement. So (4) fails to explain (3).
(4) [ htheyk i the goal ] was PROk to acquire a better pitcher.
(5) Lin’sk downfall was that image of himk /??himselfk on the wall.
Our second variant says we have structures like (6a) or (6b), with an an elided complement to reprise the
target clause; it then invokes the unusual syntax of specificational copular sentences ([15,19,20]).

(6)
(7)

a. The reason h that two outfielders were traded away i was to acquire a better pitcher.
b. The goal h of trading two outfielders i was to acquire a better pitcher.
The way Lee disturbs people is with weird images of herself/*her.

On the surface, specificational sentences allow bindings that are unacceptable elsewhere. In (7), himself is
bound by he, though the latter is within a relative clause on the subject. So perhaps in (6), PRO can likewise
be bound by an inaudible argument within the relative clause on its subject. But we note two problems.
First, ellipsis usually requires an antecedent that is both audible and of the same category; but (4b) requires
only that the trade of the outfielders be conversationally salient. Second, the target fact may be denoted by
a pronoun ([2,15]), as in (8) or (9), and yet this pronoun cannot host the relative clause audibly. It would
therefore need the covert structure [ Do [ that two outfielders were traded ] ], with the clause again elided
([21]). But binding out of this structural position is degraded, as in (10), once we control for factors that
permit unbound reflexives. And this is again strong evidence, since unbound reflexives in picture NPs are
often surprisingly good. We conclude that syntactic versions of grammatical accounts cannot be extended
to cover remote IC. We will also show that semantic versions have similar problems, pace [2].
(8) The only reason for it (*that two outfielders were traded) was to acquire a better pitcher.
(9) Two outfielders were traded away, but I don’t know why. Maybe it was to acquire a better pitcher.
(10) The best evidence for Lin’s improvement is that image of him/??himself on the wall.
Our second objection comes from the truth-conditions of rationale constructions. Whether the REASON
relation applies truly does not depend just on the event description provided by the target clause verb, or
by that verb and its arguments, pace [12]. It may depend also on modifiers, tense and modality ([13]), and
even focus ([14]). Therefore REASON must be able to have the entire meaning of the target clause as a term;
and with this clausal scope for REASON, an analysis of implicit control that does not refer specifically to the
verbal predicate is to be preferred, on grounds of compositional simplicity. But if we grant this, grammatical
accounts of IC are subverted, since no ‘implicit argument’ of the predicate is compositionally accessible,
whether to binding or to semantic identification with another variable via the meaning of REASON. This
conclusion may seem to be contradicted by the fact a quantifier in the direct object may bind into an adjoined
rationale clause. But it does not, since, as we will show, such quantifiers necessarily take scope even over
the REASON relation and this suffices ([22]) to bind variables within its arguments.
Our conclusion bolsters pragmatic accounts of rationale IC ([4,5,13]): both in local and in remote cases,
PRO is a free variable whose domain is restricted, via discourse effects of the target clause, just to parties
viewed as “responsible” for the target fact ([2,4,13,23]). This explains the interpretations of PRO, if we acknowledge that participants named by nonsubjects in the target clause are thereby represented as not responsible for the fact it expresses ([1,13,23,24]). In defense of such effects we observe comparable constraints,
not mentioned in the cited literature, on even overt pronouns in the possessor of a nominal complement to
for, in uses like (11). Here the antecedent may be either a subject or an object, depending on the situation
represented; but given a situation, the choice responds to ‘perspectival’ effects of subjecthood.
(11) { Abea got to marry Sue / Sue married Abea / #Abe married Sue } for (his)a writing nice poems.
Our conclusion also removes the familiar argument from IC that passives have an argument that is silent but
grammatically active. In turn, this raises doubts as to whether there are any such arguments with indefinite
interpretation ([25,13), an issue important to the division between pragmatics and semantics ([26,27]).
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